Introduction

"The French navy is called on to acquire a superiority over the English. The French understand building better than their rivals, and French ships, the English themselves admit, are better than theirs. The guns are superior in calibre to those of the English by one fourth. These are two great advantages..."

Napoleon The history of the French navy during the Napoleonic Wars is a tale unlike that of other country's fleets who fought during the period. Largely ruined by the destructive revolution, the navy would find itself in the unenviable position of not being able to function anywhere near the level required of it during the long wars ahead and it is remarkable that the fleet held together at all during the period of the revolution. Hampered by poor officers and repeated defeat, it would take Napoleon his greatest efforts to rejuvenate the navy of France and provide the groundwork for it's eventual recovery after his fall.

Overview

Before the French revolution began, France had had a navy she could be justifiably proud of. Excellent ships manned by well trained crews made her a force to be reckoned with and the fact that this same navy had fought the English to a virtual standstill tactically and had beaten her strategically during the American Revolution was enough to rank her very close if not on par with the Royal Navy of England. However, like the French Royal Army, the internal organization of the navy was such that it was ripe for the picking when the revolution began. The navy, perhaps even more so than the army, was officered almost entirely around aristocrats with little room for advancement of anyone whose blood was anything less than royal blue. The French Revolution quickly and bloodily changed the entire picture, opening the way for anyone (and sometimes this was literally true) to become an officer of a man of war. Tragically, this upheaval in organization didn't recognize the plain fact that when dealing with a technical piece of equipment, and a ship of the line was certainly that, one could not replace knowledge and experience with revolutionary fervor and hope to win any battles. In addition, the revolutionary government seemed to forget that, unlike an army living off the land, a fleet had to be supplied with all manner of equipment from previously well stocked arsenals; the major arsenals began to deteriorate immediately after the beginning of the revolution (1). The resulting chaos during the first years of the revolution proved to be an incredible obstacle for the navy to recover from as everything had to be started again from scratch under a revolutionary government that had no idea how to supply, let alone use, a once mighty fleet. The disaster that was the French navy of the revolution would leave an indelible imprint on the fleet that would emerge later under Napoleon.

One of the first tasks Napoleon undertook when he came to power was to rebuild the navy and try to make it into a force that could make a difference one day in the affairs of France.

He was under no illusions; the task ahead would take years to build the ships, cost a great deal of money and probably not bear any fruit for a long time. These facts, something that the revolutionary governments could not fathom, did not daunt him and he set the program in motion to produce a fleet that would one day surpass the strength of the pre war navy and, just maybe, secure him enough time to pull off the cross channel invasion and conquer England. At the very least, this "fleet in being" would tie down large numbers of English ships and cause them to spend enormous amounts of money to maintain a firm blockade over the ports of France.

The aformentioned facts show that Napoleon was strongly committed to the navy and knew the place it could take in France's affairs. With these ideas in mind, he set his zeal and organizational skill to work. His reforms would touch every aspect of naval life.

Napoleon knew that in order to have an effective navy, he would have to improve the basic weaknesses that were afflicting the service. One of the first things he did was to shake up the officer corps and make sure that it was composed of men who were actually qualified or had the promise to do the job (2). Consequently, the navy was turned inside out and released of all of it's poorer performers; too many times in the past years negligent captains had allowed their vessels to be captured after a pitiful defense, even when their ship was by far the stronger of the two contestants (3). Next, the country was divided into five arrondissements maritimes, or naval districts, so that Napoleon could exercise greater control over the major naval arsenals that each district contained. The district prefects that he selected performed their jobs in the same manner for their districts as Napoleon did for the country as a whole; within each district, the prefect concerned himself with ship construction, naval supplies and, most importantly, manpower. This last item was controlled by registering all men in each district who had anything at all to do with the sea so that when the time came they could be called up to serve in a new ship or for service in the dockyards. Finally, Napoleon took the great step forward of insisting on having permanent crews for his ships, much like soldiers in the army served in their respective regiments. This order, which at the time was nearly incomprehensible to naval people, was followed up in 1808 with a more formal decree in which the sailors were organized into numbered battalions, called Equipages de Haut-Bord, and then assigned to various vessels in the fleet. All these measures were good for the navy and given a few years of peace so that they could take effect, the navy could have performed at a level not seen for many years. As it resulted, the navy did improve in performance, the victories in the Indian Ocean (4) and the short fleet actions in 1813 and 1814 showing what could happen, but the respite that was so needed would never come about and it would not be until several years after Napoleon's second abdication that the navy would begin to revive again. Ironically, the Bourbons, who came to power again in France after Napoleon's abdication in 1815, would re-adopt the idea of permanent ship crews and then be imitated by most other countries.

The Battle of Trafalgar: An End Or A Beginning?

There are many legends and myths that surround this much publicized battle but one myth that needs to be struck down is the state of the French navy after the battle of Trafalgar. Standard histories (many of which are highly regarded) usually end their commentaries with this famous action but few seem to realize that the French navy did not in fact vanish but in reality surged to new strengths, especially after the incorporation of Holland into France. In 1813, the French fleet matched the strength of the pre-revolutionary navy and had more new ships with heavier armaments. Napoleon's ship building program was in full swing by then and even at the time of his first abdication in 1814 there were 37 ships building in the various ports of the Empire which, if they had been completed, would have given France a fleet of well over 100 sail of the line. In this sense, the battle of Trafalgar was more a blow to the morale of the navy than to its strength but perhaps the greatest damage was the continued erosion of confidence that the French sailor had in his superiors. Villenueve and Dumanoir would be the culprits for this at Trafalgar but the same tendencies would be found again in Linois, the victor of Algeciras in 1801, when he engaged a fleet of East Indiamen only to be bluffed into retiring by their showing a bold front. Napoleon, a man who knew better than most what the power of the morale could be, remarked that the preceding admiral "lacked courage of the mind" and it showed why his fleet could not win virtually any battles.

It has been said that Napoleon never understood naval warfare but, while he always expected great things from all his soldiers whether on land or sea, the French Emperor knew a great deal more about the matter than is generally credited. Unfortunately for him, his available admirals lacked the dash that made successes out of men like England's Nelson or Cochrane. Perhaps these admirals viewed it as realism in the circumstances but their subsequent neglect often caused utter disaster to strike, the best cases being at two of the major actions of the war: the Nile in 1798 and Trafalgar in 1805. In the first case, Vice Amiral Brueys should have entered Alexandria or sailed to Corfu (as General Bonaparte later ordered). Instead, he chose the small bay of Aboukir which, if properly defended would not have been a bad choice. However, his conduct here, though courageous in battle, left much to be desired as he allowed himself to be surprised (all of his light ships being in the harbor and therefore useless for scouting) and then, because of his ships placement too far from the shore, he had his force destroyed piecemeal. His ships fought well, as French ships always seemed to be able to take tremendous punishment, but in vain. The second battle, Trafalgar, was another example of poor overall leadership leading to disaster. Vice Amiral Villenueve should never have sailed out of Cadiz harbor in the first place as his replacement, Vice Amiral Rosily, was on his way south to take over. While it is true that Napoleon's orders to Villenueve told him to engage equal or inferior fleets, it cannot be imagined that the French admiral did not know that his leader counted every two Spanish ships as one Frenchman and that according to that revised count he should not engage. Napoleon knew his fleet was still weak from so many years of mismanagement and he also knew that the Spanish navy was virtually worthless as a fighting force; Villenueve knew this too but of all the options available, the unfortunate admiral chose precisely the wrong one, a trend all too common with the French navy. Secondly, once the fleet had sailed, why did he attempt to get back to Cadiz when the option was really unavailable? Considering the fact that eventually every French ship involved in the battle would be lost (the ones that made it to port being taken over by the Spanish in 1808) would it not have been better to keep going in the hope of escaping with some force rather than losing it all? These questions cannot be answered of course but seem to underline the fact that at sea, Napoleon had no Davout or Lannes (5). Indeed, he himself admitted on St. Helena that "I especially liked sailors...but I never found between them and myself the man who would have made them worthy..." This fact, perhaps more than any other, was the ultimate result of the revolution and the damage it caused to the navy of France under Napoleon.

Article 15 Of The Peace Treaty of May 30, 1814

When Napoleon abdicated for the first time in 1814, the English saw to it that the powerful navy left to France by Napoleon was carefully reduced in strength by stripping away many of the ships residing in what were now considered foreign ports (e.g. Antwerp and Venice) and breaking up all ships being built at these ports. As a result of this particular article in the peace treaty of May 30, 1814, the French navy lost nine ships of the line that were already built and seventeen that were in various stages of construction. It is interesting to note that of the 37 ships being built, well over half of them would have been of 80 guns or more which clearly was in anticipation of what would happen to ship building after the wars were over.

Ships Under Construction On May 30, 1814

All ships building at Antwerp and Venice were broken up on the stocks.
All other ships completed after the wars were over.

Sail of the Line of the French Navy

France entered what would become known as the Napoleonic Wars with 76 sail of the line available for service all of which, save one, carried 74 or more cannon. The 64 gun ship of the line, a ship class that still endured in many other navies, had all but disappeared from the French active fleet lists and for good reason. France had standardized her ship designs into four basic types: 118, 110, 80 and 74 gun ships of the line. This simplification, coupled with master plans produced by the great naval architect Sane, helped streamline production and gave all the ships of the same type similar characteristics. According to the original French naval registers which record sailing qualities of each ship, there is an unmistakable trend noticeable in that most of the ships designed to the plans of Sane behaved quite well under sail while many of the captured types were described as poor sailers. This may well be a bias towards the official's own country but the fact that not all of the enemy ships are described thus (the English Hannibal, captured at Algeciras in 1801, being so favored) leads one to believe that the judgements are fair especially since these papers could be reviewed at any time by Napoleon who's eye for critical detail would have picked up on anything resembling bias; the emperor might publish Bulletins for the masses to consume but his own internal affairs he demanded to be exact and truthful lest the individual concerned run the risk of the imperial wrath.

The most powerful ships of the Napoleonic Wars were France's 118 gun ships of the line of which there would be a total of ten serving during that time. Fine ships capable of maneuvering quite well for their size (6), their punishing broadsides could lay waste to enemy vessels as what happened to the English Bellerophon at the battle of the Nile in 1798. These ships, however, were quite expensive in terms of building materials, artillery and manpower and so were reserved for admirals as their fleet flagships. It is interesting to note that though these ships were costly, their design changed to become even larger in terms of overall tonnage with the introduction of the Imperial in 1803. Mounting 18 pound cannon on her third gun deck (unheard of in French three decked ships of the period) she would set the example for all of the French 118 gun ships to follow.

The 110 gun ship of the line had been the standard large three decker in the 1780's but by the time Napoleon took power had become something of an anachronism as only two more of this type ship were ever completed after 1799. Large and impressive, the ships of this class gave a good account of themselves during the wars and not one was ever captured by the enemy during the entire period. The 110 gun sail of the line was almost reborn at the end of the war, four of shallow draft were being constructed at Antwerp in 1814, but the ships were broken up on the stocks by the allies and never finished.

France had been instrumental in the advancement of the ship classes and design and this was clearly shown by their early elimination of the weak 64 gun ship of the line in favor of the 74 gun ship. More pointedly, the adoption of the later post war standard 80 gun sail of the line was almost entirely due to its general use by the French fleet who recognized its great advantages over the other standard line ships in use during the period. To get a better appreciation of this, one must know some of the details of French on board artillery. The French pound of the period was significantly heavier than its English equivalent and this had always allowed the French to have heavier broadsides when two ships of the same type engaged one another (7). This state of affairs lasted well into the 1790's when English designers tried to close the gap by introducing a 74 ship that mounted 24 pound cannon on her upper deck. While few of these ships were actually made (later classes mounted 18 pound cannon once again) this may well have provided the impetus for the French to begin concentrating on their 80 gun ships which already mounted 24 pound cannon on their upper decks. French 80 gun ships were fine vessels and were well known for their ability to absorb tremendous punishment (8); virtually every ship of this type captured by the English was put back in service by them and one, the Francklin of 1797, became the basis for an entire class of English ships after the wars were over (9). Given their armament, strength and excellent handling characteristics, the versatile French 80 gun sail of the line were easily the best ships of the line built during the entire Napoleonic Wars.

The 74 gun ship of the line, the standard battleship of virtually every navy, had been the pride of the French fleet for many years. Fast and well armed, capable of taking and dishing out heavy damage, they formed the backbone of Napoleon's fleet during the entire period. These ships came in two distinct types. The first type was the standard deep water port 74 which made up the bulk of the fleet. The second type grew out of the need to build sail of the line in ports whose depth was not entirely suitable for the task. These ships, called a petite modele, were shorter in length and drew slightly less water while keeping the same armament. The petite modele 74 gun ship Boree was the test ship for this design and was completed at Toulon to the plans of Sane in 1805. Thenceforth, the rest of the ships of this type came out of Antwerp, Genoa and Venice.

The French navy had one 64 gun ship in commission, the Brillant, when the wars began and, though more would be captured and acquired during the period, this single indigenous small two decker would be broken up by 1794. No other 64 gun ships would be made by the French navy.

Armaments of the French Sail of the Line

The following table details the armaments of French sail of the line during the period. The second entries for each ship type illustrate the addition of carronades made during the early 1800's. Note that the numbers of cannon on the earlier ships more closely reflects the stated nominal number of guns of the class while the later vessels bear no relation at all to them. For this reason, many histories list French 74 gun ships as 80 plus gun ships which is true in the sense of number of guns but absolutely false when comparing ship types. Generally, French 80 gun ships displaced nearly four hundred more tons than the smaller 74 gun ships.

Notes

• 1. This state of affairs would last well into the years of the Empire.
• 2. It is interesting to note that this was not the first time the officer corps had been "shaken up" but it would be the last time during the wars.
• 3. Of the twenty six captains serving at the "Glorious First Of June" in 1794, eleven of them had never been any form of officer aboard a warship and many of the others, including Contre Amiral Villaret-Joyeuse, had been lieutenants only a few years previously.
• 4. The multiple frigate action at Grand Port in 1810 being the one clear French naval victory of the entire war.
• 5. Both these men were Marshals of France and would lead brilliant careers on the continent.
• 6. The Commerce de Marseille, captured intact at Toulon in 1794, impressed her captors considerably and was declared a fine sailing vessel, especially easy to handle for her size.
• 7. As an example, the French 36 pound shot weighed in at nearly 39 English pounds.
• 8. The Tonnant, lost at the Nile in 1798, was a good example of a very badly battered ship which nevertheless served her captors well in the years ahead.
• 9. The Canopus class of ships were designed to the lines of the Francklin.